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This chapter considers the question of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts at 
the stage of submission of a foreign judgment for recognition. Existing cases dea-
ling with both recognition of foreign judgments and with the recognition of foreign 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention fail to provide a clear position 
on (1) whether either personal jurisdiction, or quasi in rem jurisdiction through 
the presence of the judgment/award debtor’s assets, is required, and (2) if quasi in 
rem jurisdiction is relied upon, just what allegation or proof of the presence of the 
judgment/award debtor’s assets within the jurisdiction is necessary. The analysis 
here ends with the conclusion that due process for purposes of recognition juris-
diction may be satisﬁ ed based on concepts of consent that are fundamental to the 
operation of both the New York Convention and the 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. Such a result would place the United States in a 
position consistent with its future treaty partners under the Hague Convention on 
the matter of recognition jurisdiction.
Key words: jurisdiction, recognition jurisdiction, foreign judgment recognition, 
foreign judgments, Hague Choice of Court Convention 
* Prof. Ronald A. Brand, Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor, and Director, 
Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 3900 
Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh 
** I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Kreπimir Sajko for his consistently pleasant 
and constructive involvement in the years of negotiations that led to the 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which is the subject of this chapter. It was 
indeed both a pleasure and a privilege to be able to work with him on that project. I wish 
to thank Stephen Burbank and Cristina Mariottini for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft, and Aleksandra Williams for her research assistance.
 Ronald A. Brand: Recognition Jurisdiction and the Hague Choice of Court Convention178
I. INTRODUCTION
While the United States and the European Union have both signed the 
2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Convention),1 
thus indicating their intentions to move toward ratiﬁ cation, each has special 
issues and concerns that must be addressed in order for those ratiﬁ cations to 
occur.2 In the United States, one of these concerns lies in the special way in 
which judicial jurisdiction in every case originally brought in a U.S. court is a 
Constitutional matter.3 The fact that U.S. jurisprudence separates judicial juri-
sdiction into separate components of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, 
and that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require 
a determination in each case that the court has proper jurisdiction “over” the 
defendant (i.e., that the defendant’s due process rights to life, liberty, and pro-
perty have been respected in the procedures by which he or she is subjected 
to the court’s power and authority), separates the United States from all other 
nations when considering basic issues of judicial jurisdiction.4
1 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice 
of Court Agreements (“Hague Convention”), availble at http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.  The United States signed the Convention on 
Jan. 1, 2009, and the European Union signed on April 1, 2009. Information on the status 
of the Convention can be found at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.
status&cid=98.
2 The U.S. State Department Ofﬁ ce of the Legal Adviser, Ofﬁ ce of Private International 
Law has established a Study Group on the Hague Convention in order to discuss such is-
sues. See 74 Fed. Reg. 30,660 (June 26, 2009). In the European Union, the discussion of 
ratiﬁ cation of the Hague Convention overlaps with review of the Brussels I Regulation. 
See, e.g., Letter of 13 July 2009 from Hans van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, to European Union Directorate-General Jus-
tice, Freedom, and Security, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consult-
ing_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others/hague_conference_
on_private_international_law_en.pdf.
3 For a discussion of the Constitutional nature of jurisdiction in U.S. courts, originally 
prepared as a background document for the negotiations that led to the Hague Conven-
tion, see Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 
U. PITT. L. REV. 661 (1999)
4 See id.
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This aberration in U.S. procedure has special implications at two stages of 
the process of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. First, U.S. 
law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generally requires 
that the judgment for which recognition is being sought was obtained in the 
foreign forum upon conditions that satisfy the U.S. jurisdictional due process 
requirements (and not just the jurisdictional rules of the originating foreign 
forum).5 Second, the U.S. court (whether state or federal), before which recogni-
tion and enforcement is sought, must address the question of whether personal 
jurisdiction exists in the recognition action itself in order to grant recognition 
of the foreign judgment (the recognition jurisdiction question). Recent cases 
involving actions for the recognition of both foreign judgments and foreign 
arbitral awards have raised important questions about this second stage of 
jurisdictional analysis.6 The result is a lack of clarity regarding whether, and 
what type of, a separate jurisdictional analysis is required at the recognition 
and enforcement stage.
In the U.S. ratiﬁ cation and implementation of the Hague Convention, it 
will be important both to establish a clear rule on the recognition jurisdiction 
issue and to coordinate that rule with the parallel requirements for recognition 
jurisdiction in the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards un-
der the New York Convention7 and the Federal Arbitration Act.8 The Hague 
Convention, if properly implemented in the United States, should bring about 
a more level playing ﬁ eld between arbitration agreements/awards and choice of 
5 See, e.g., Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 4(a)(2) (“1962 Recog-
nition Act”), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/
ufmjra62.htm; Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(2) 
(“2005 Recognition Act”), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/
2005ﬁ nal.htm; and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(b) (1986).
6 A defense to personal jurisdiction may be waived, making consent always an acceptable 
basis of personal jurisdiction, both for purposes of an original action in any court in the 
United States and for purposes of considering whether a foreign originating court had 
personal jurisdiction for purposes of recognition and enforcement of the resulting judg-
ment in a court in the United States.
7 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“New York Convention”), done at New York, June 10, 1958, entered into force 
for the United States on June 7, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 
38, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConven-
tion.html.
8 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.
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court agreements/judgments.9 This can only occur if there is a rational paral-
lel approach to the question of recognition jurisdiction under each of the two 
regimes. Whether this approach focuses most heavily on the defendant’s due 
process rights or on consistency with practice in other nations (or attempts some 
combination of the two), will be important for parties to private contracts and 
transnational arbitration and litigation for the foreseeable future.
In this chapter I will ﬁ rst review brieﬂ y the concerns that make personal 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts a Constitutional matter, thus separating it from the 
process of determining initial judicial competence to hear a case in other legal 
systems. I will then review the approach U.S. courts have taken in applying this 
personal jurisdiction analysis when faced with the question of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Finally, I will comment 
on the implications of this jurisprudence for the process of implementation of 
the Hague Convention in the United States.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN 
THE UNITED STATES
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
the federal government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or pro-
perty, without due process of law.10 The Fourteenth Amendment extends the 
same limitation to state governments. The application of these two clauses to 
jurisdictional decisions in cases involving foreign defendants in U.S. courts 
requires an understanding of certain elements of the federal system. First, 
concepts of vertical federalism (i.e., federal-state relations) mean that, unless 
the matter before a court is based on a federal statute, the relevant Due Process 
Clause usually is that in the Fourteenth Amendment, which is applicable to 
the states.11 Second, concepts of horizontal federalism (state-state relations) 
9 For a discussion of the Hague Convention and its likely impact, see RONALD A. BRAND & 
PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS: COM-
MENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (Cambridge University Press 2008).
10 The Fifth Amendment was ratiﬁ ed with the ﬁ rst ten Amendments (the Bill of Rights) effec-
tive December 15, 1791, and includes the provision that, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11 The Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratiﬁ ed on July 9, 1868, provides in Section 1, 
that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
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are implicated in that the vast majority of cases that raise the question of 
jurisdictional due process given to “foreign” defendants deal with defendants 
from other U.S. states, not defendants from other nations, and thus apply the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This all means that the due process rules applicable 
to non-U.S. defendants have been developed largely in cases involving parties 
from different U.S. states, applying the clause as a limitation on judicial reach 
of the U.S. state involved.
a) Due Process in Interstate Cases
In the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff,12 the U.S. Supreme Court set the stage 
for all subsequent jurisdictional cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause (and the Fifth Amendment Clause as well) by focusing on 
a territorial approach to jurisdiction over the defendant.13 The decision enun-
ciated “two well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction 
of an independent State over persons and property”:
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and soverei-
gnty over persons and property within its territory. . . . . The other principle . . . is, 
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property 
without its territory.14
The Court held that an Oregon court was without personal jurisdiction over 
a California defendant when service had been only by publication.15
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. There area exceptions to the general statement in the 
text, in particular when jurisdiction in a non-federal question case is based on national 
contacts. See, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(k)(1)(b) and 4(k)(2).
12 95 U.S. 714 (1877). “Rightly or wrongly, Pennoyer v. Neff, linked American jurisdictional 
law with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and however questionable 
that linkage may be, it has become part of American conventional wisdom.” Friedrich 
K. Juenger, Constitutionalizing German Jurisdictional Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 521 (1996) 
(book review).
13 “The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the 
State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits 
would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, in illegitimate 
assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.” 95 U.S. at 720.
14 Id. at 722.
15 Id. at 734. “Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement 
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In Milliken v. Meyer,16 the Supreme Court held that domicile in the forum 
state “is alone sufﬁ cient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the 
state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appro-
priate substituted service.”17 This aspect of the due process analysis creates 
clear parallels with the general jurisdiction provision found in Article 2 of the 
Brussels I Regulation,18 which also provides for jurisdiction over a defendant 
in the courts of the state of the defendant’s domicile. 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 the Court moved beyond a strict 
territorial analysis, recognizing the need for to deal with legal persons that can 
operate in many states simultaneously. The decision established the breadth of 
jurisdictional reach under the due process analysis, noting that,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, 
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’20
The International Shoe Court further noted two variables in determining the 
constitutionality of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. The ﬁ rst is the 
extent and intensity of the defendant’s activities in the forum state, and the 
second is the connection between those activities and the cause of action.21 
“Continuous and systematic” activity supports general jurisdiction over a de-
fendant, allowing general jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of his place of 
domicile and whether or not the cause of action arises out of those activities.22 
in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine 
the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction 
do not constitute due process of law.” Id. at 733.
16 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
17 Id. at 462.
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 22(5), 
O.J.E.U. L 12/1 (Jan. 16, 2001) (“Brussels I Regulation”).
19 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20 Id. at 313 (quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
21 Id. at 316-320.
22 Id. at 317: “Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the acti-
vities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also 
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to 
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This clearly extends the general jurisdiction rule beyond a rigid defendant’s 
domicile rule like that found in the Brussels I Regulation.23 A “single isolated” 
contact, on the other hand, will (at most) support only speciﬁ c jurisdiction, 
and the cause of action then must arise out of that contact.24
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,25 the Court acknowledged a “continuing 
process of evolution [of due process concepts, in which the] Court accepted and 
then abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’ as the standard for 
measuring the extent of state judicial power over [foreign] corporations.”26 The 
Court concluded that the limitations of Pennoyer had given way to constitutional 
acceptance of expanded jurisdiction, giving the reasons for this acceptance as 
follows:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible 
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental 
transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial 
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by 
the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a 
great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At 
the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much 
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages 
in economic activity.27
The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not prevent jurisdiction in 
a California Court over a defendant insurance company that had dealt with 
California residents only by mail, and that “[i]t is sufﬁ cient for purposes of due 
an agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355, 
1 S. Ct. 354, 359, 27 L. Ed. 222; . . . . Conversely it has been generally recognized that 
the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items 
of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on 
causes of action unconnected with the activities there.
23 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 18, art. 2.
24 The distinction between general and speciﬁ c jurisdiction was ﬁ rst suggested in Arthur 
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-1164 (1966).
25 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26 Id. at 221.
27 Id. at 222-223.
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process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection 
with that State.”28
In Hanson v. Denckla,29 the Court noted the evolution from the “rigid rule” 
of Pennoyer v. Neff to the more “ﬂ exible standard” of International Shoe,30 but 
refused to acknowledge “the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts.”31 Instead, the Court returned to the territorial 
concepts of Pennoyer, ﬁ nding the Due Process Clause to be “more than a gua-
rantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.”32 In reverting to a 
territorial orientation, the decision also reiterated the need for a nexus between 
the conduct of the defendant and the forum state: “[I]t is essential in each case 
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
beneﬁ ts and protections of its laws.”33
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,34 the Court stressed both the rights of 
defendants and the resulting limitations on state jurisdiction:
28 355 U.S. at 223. The Court further elaborated as follows: “The contract was delivered 
in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of 
that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in 
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay 
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow 
the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When 
claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost 
of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in effect making the company judgment 
proof. Often the crucial witnesses—as here on the company’s defense of suicide—will be 
found in the insured’s locality. Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it 
is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing 
which amounts to a denial of due process.” Id. at 223-224.
29 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
30 Id. at 251.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 251: “Those restrictions . . . are a consequence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign 
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal 
contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.”
33 Id. at 253.
34 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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As has long been settled, and as we reafﬁ rm today, a state court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist “mi-
nimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State. . . . . The concept of 
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, 
functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do 
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns 
in a federal system.35
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court found a New York automobile dealer 
and a New York automobile distributor to have insufﬁ cient contacts with the 
forum state of Oklahoma to satisfy due process for a suit resulting out of an 
automobile accident in Oklahoma. The defendants in question had no real 
contacts with Oklahoma, other than the fact that an automobile they had sold 
had made its way into Oklahoma without any direction or intention on the 
part of the defendants. 
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court made clear that the concept of minimum 
contacts is only the ﬁ rst element of the required analysis. The second element 
is the concept of reasonableness and fairness:
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of “rea-
sonableness” or “ fairness.” We have said that the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
State must be such that maintenance of the suit “does not offend “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.” . . . . The relationship between the defendant and 
the forum must be such that it is “reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend 
the particular suit which is brought there.”36
This focus on reasonableness led the Court to a balancing test of relevant 
interests:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the 
defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered 
in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating 
the dispute; the plaintiff ’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least 
when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff ’s power to choose the 
forum; the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efﬁ cient resolution 
35 444 U.S. at 291-292.
36 Id. at 292 (quoting from International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
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of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.37
Minimum contacts and reasonableness were found not to be controlled by, 
but rather tempered by, the concept of foreseeability: “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone 
has never been a sufﬁ cient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due 
Process Clause.”38 However,
[t]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseea-
bility that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product 
will ﬁ nd its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and 
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there.39
This level of foreseeability may result from the defendant’s conduct in placing 
goods into a “stream of commerce”:
When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State,” . . ., it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and 
can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing 
the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection 
with the State. . . . . The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process 
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum State.40
b) Due Process in Transnational Cases
The analysis applied in interstate cases has been extended to cases crossing 
national borders. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,41 a wrongful 
death action was brought in Texas state court against a Colombian corporation 
(Helicol) as the result of a helicopter crash in Peru, causing death to four U.S. 
citizens and others. The Supreme Court held that a combination of “purchases 
37 Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 295.
39 Id. at 297.
40 Id. at 297-298.
41 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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and related trips, standing alone, are not a sufﬁ cient basis for a State’s assertion 
of jurisdiction.”42 
Helicopteros has become best known for its delineation of speciﬁ c and general 
“doing business” jurisdiction.43 “When a controversy is related to or “arises 
out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a “re-
lationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” is the essential 
foundation of in personam jurisdiction.”44 Thus, speciﬁ c jurisdiction requires 
that the cause of action in litigation “arise out of,” and thus be directly related 
to, the activities of the defendant within the forum state.45 
General jurisdiction may be founded on the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state alone, regardless of where the cause of action arises. “Even when 
the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s 
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting 
the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufﬁ cient contacts 
between the State and the foreign corporation.”46 So long as the contacts are 
“continuous and systematic,” they may support jurisdiction even though the 
cause of action does not “arise out of” those contacts.47 The Helicopteros Court 
found the cause of action at issue not to have arisen out of the contacts with 
Texas, thereby avoiding a discussion of speciﬁ c jurisdiction. It then ruled that 
general jurisdiction did not exist under the Due Process Clause.48
In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Calif.,49 two opinions 
- each joined by four Justices - take divergent positions on the “stream of 
commerce” language of World-Wide Volkswagen. Justice O’Connor adopted a 
“stream of commerce plus” approach, according to which the mere insertion of 
a product into the stream of commerce, absent some purposeful act availing 
the defendant of the beneﬁ ts of the forum state, should not support constitu-
tional jurisdiction:
42 Id.
43 For the origins of this distinction, see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1144-
64.
44 466 U.S. at 414.
45 Id. at 415.
46 Id. at 414.
47 Id. at 414-415 (discussing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-780 (1984)).
48 Id. at 418-419.
49 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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The “substantial connection,” . . . between the defendant and the forum State necessary 
for a ﬁ nding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State. . . . The placement of a product into 
the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State. . . . . But a defendant’s awareness that the stream 
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the 
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward 
the forum State.50
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, on the other hand, would have accep-
ted a simple stream of commerce test.51 Neither position was necessary to the 
holding in the case, with all nine Justices agreeing that it was unreasonable to 
assert jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant simply for purposes of deciding 
what had become a dispute only with a Taiwanese party.52
III. RECOGNITION JURISDICTION FOR FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
a) The Supreme Court Footnote
In Shaffer v. Heitner,53 the Supreme Court addressed the difﬁ cult question of 
extending jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant does not have the 
necessary contacts with the forum state to support personal jurisdiction, but 
property of the defendant is located in that state.54 In a footnote, the Court 
stated:
50 480 U.S. at 112.
51 “The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regu-
lar and anticipated ﬂ ow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As 
long as a participant in this process is aware that the ﬁ nal product is being marketed in 
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id. at 117 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 “Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and 
the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.” 
Id. at 116.
53 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
54 For a complete discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner, see, Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: 
The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.. REV. 33 (1978).
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Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant 
is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action 
to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not 
that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original 
matter.55
This language has been at the core of all subsequent cases addressing the 
question of recognition jurisdiction, whether in the context of foreign judgments 
recognition or of recognition of foreign arbitral awards.
b) The Three Basic Alternatives
While Shaffer v. Heitner was not an action for recognition of a foreign nation 
judgment, its footnote 36 has become the starting point for the debate over just 
what the due process requirements are for recognition jurisdiction. Decisions 
indicate three possible approaches.
One end of the spectrum is represented in the language of the New York 
Appellate Division decision in Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric, Inc.56 There the court 
held
that the judgment debtor need not be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York before 
the judgment creditor may obtain recognition and enforcement of the foreign country 
money judgment, as neither the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
nor New York law requires that the New York court have a jurisdictional basis for 
proceeding against a judgment debtor.57
This approach, carried to the extreme, allows a recognition action to be 
brought whether or not the defendant has contacts with the forum state, and 
whether or not the defendant has assets within the state against which the 
judgment could be enforced. In Lenchyshyn, the New York court went so far as 
to state that
even if defendants do not presently have assets in New York, plaintiffs nevertheless 
should be granted recognition of the foreign country money judgment pursuant to [the 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act], and thereby should have the 
55 433 U.S. at 210 n.36.
56 281 A.D.2d 42, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2001).
57 Id. at 43, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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opportunity to pursue all such enforcement steps in futuro, whenever it might appear 
that defendants are maintaining assets in New York.58
The other end of the spectrum is represented by a case from the Fourth 
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals which addressed recognition jurisdiction for 
purposes of recognizing and enforcing a foreign arbitral award. In Base Metal 
Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminim Factory”,59 the court held that even 
quasi in rem jurisdiction through the attachment of assets of the judgment 
debtor within the state is not sufﬁ cient, and that personal jurisdiction over the 
judgment debtor is always required in a judgments recognition action.
In the middle are cases that ﬁ nd jurisdiction to be proper when either (1) 
the defendant has sufﬁ cient personal contacts to satisfy standard minimum 
contacts analysis, or (2) there are assets of the defendant in the forum state, 
even if those assets are unrelated to the claim in the underlying judgment.60 
This appears to be the position followed in both the Restatement (Third) Foreign 
Relations Law61 and the American Law Institute’s 2005 Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute ALI Proposed Federal 
Statute.62 The Restatement states that, while
a state has jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim on the basis of presence of property in 
the forum only where the property is reasonably connected with the claim, an action to 
enforce a judgment may usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found, 
without any necessary connection between the underlying action and the property, or 
between the defendant and the forum.63
58 281 A.D.2d at 50, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
59 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 822 (2002).
60 See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co. Ltd., 202 F. Supp.2d 905, 910 (N.D. Ia. 
2002) (“the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause does not pre-
vent a state from enforcing another state’s valid judgment against a judgment-debtor’s 
property located in that state, regardless of the lack of other minimum contacts by the 
judgment-debtor”); Electrolines v. Prudential Assurance Co. Inc., 260 Mich.App. 144, 
163, 677 N.W.2d 874, 885 (2003) (“in an action brought to enforce a judgment, the 
trial court must possess jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s 
property”).
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. h (1986).
62 ALI, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FED-
ERAL STATUTE § 9 (2005).
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. h (1986).
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The ALI Proposed Federal Statute similarly provides in section 9:
(b) An action to recognize or enforce a judgment under this Act may be brought in the 
appropriate state or federal court
(i) where the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction; or
(ii) where assets belonging to the judgment debtor are situated.
Each of these documents thus allows an action for recognition and enfor-
cement to proceed if there exists either personal jurisdiction over the judgment 
debtor or quasi in rem jurisdiction resulting from the presence of property 
of the judgment debtor within the forum state. By allowing for quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, they avoid a strict requirement that personal jurisdiction exist in 
all cases.64
c) Statutory and Case Law Developments
In 2005, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) completed its Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act (2005 Recognition Act).65 This Act was largely an updated 
version of the 1962 Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act (1962 
Recognition Act).66 One of the changes made by the 2005 Act, as compared to 
the 1962 Act, is described by NCCUSL as follows:
The 2005 Act addresses the speciﬁ c procedure for seeking enforcement. If recognition 
is sought as an original matter, the party seeking recognition must ﬁ le an action in 
the court to obtain recognition. If recognition is sought in a pending action, it may be 
ﬁ led as a counter-claim, cross-claim or afﬁ rmative defense in the pending action. The 
1962 Act does not address the procedure to obtain recognition at all, leaving that to 
other state law.67
64 The question not clearly answered in either case is whether the type of in rem jurisdic-
tion addressed here will allow recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment only 
up to the value of the local assets which are the bases of jurisdiction (even though not 
effective against the world as in normal in rem actions), or recognition against the defen-
dant in the same manner as would be the case with personal jurisdiction.
65 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 5
66 1962 Recognition Act, supra note 5.
67 Uniform Law Commissioners, Summary, Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uni-
formacts-s-ufcmjra.asp.
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This change is accomplished in Section 6 of the new Act, which reads as 
follows:
SECTION 6. Procedure for Recognition of Foreign-Country Judgment.
(a) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the 
issue of recognition shall be raised by ﬁ ling an action seeking recognition of the foreign-
country judgment.
(b) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought in a pending action, the issue 
of recognition may be raised by counterclaim, cross-claim, or afﬁ rmative defense.68
Raising the issue of recognition defensively in a pending action will not 
invoke problems of personal jurisdiction, because the party against whom the 
issue is raised (likely the plaintiff) will already have consented to jurisdiction 
by bringing the action. Thus, it is paragraph (a) which is important to the per-
sonal jurisdiction issue. A requirement that the issue of recognition be raised 
“by ﬁ ling an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment,”69 
suggests that personal jurisdiction must exist for that action. Nonetheless, the 
comments to the 2005 Act speciﬁ cally avoid taking a position on recognition 
jurisdiction.70
While the Uniform Law Commissioners could side-step the question of 
personal jurisdiction requirements and just what footnote 36 in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner means to the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments, 
courts have not always been able to do so. Still, the number of cases in which 
the question has been raised has been signiﬁ cantly limited. This is mostly be-
cause few judgment recognition actions seem to have been brought in a court 
68 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 5, § 6.
69 Id.
70 Id., comment 4: “While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recogni-
tion of a foreign-country judgment may be raised, it is not intended to create any new 
procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise effect existing state proce-
dural requirements. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country 
judgment is sought under Section 6 must comply with all state procedural rules with 
regard to that type of action. Nor does this Act address the question of what constitutes 
a sufﬁ cient basis for jurisdiction to adjudicate with regard to an action under Section 6. 
Courts have split over the issue of whether the presence of assets of the debtor in a state 
is a sufﬁ cient basis for jurisdiction in light of footnote 36 of the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977). This Act takes no position 
on that issue.”
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in which there is neither personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor nor 
assets of the judgment debtor in the forum state against which the judgment 
may be enforced.
Beyond the Shaffer footnote, the Lenchyshyn case has become the established 
starting point for judicial discussion of the personal jurisdiction question.71 
Later decisions have focused primarily on the New York Appellate Division’s 
conclusion in Lenchyshyn that a party “need not establish a basis for the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor by the New York courts.”72 
In Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., Ltd.,73 the Federal District Court for 
the Northern District of Iowa found the Lenchyshyn analysis to be persuasive, 
stating that 
[t]he Iowa [Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act] itself contains no requirement of 
personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. The court notes that in the context of the 
recognition and enforcement of other state judgments, the minimum contacts requirement 
of the Due Process Clause does not prevent a state from enforcing another state’s valid 
judgment against a judgment-debtor’s property located in that state, regardless of the 
lack of other minimum contacts by the judgment-debtor.
It appears from the facts of the Pure Fishing case that the defendant did have 
property within the state of Iowa. Thus, this statement can be argued as going 
beyond the facts of the case, with the holding being that personal jurisdiction 
is not required when quasi in rem jurisdiction is available. Lenchyshyn itself is a 
bit more difﬁ cult in this regard. There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
had assets within the forum state, but that fact was not speciﬁ cally established. 
Accepting jurisdiction in Pure Fishing, when the defendant had property within 
the forum state, is something different from accepting jurisdiction on the mere 
allegation of property within the jurisdiction without requiring proof of that 
property’s existence. At any rate, to the extent the language of either of these 
two cases suggests that neither personal nor quasi in rem jurisdiction is required, 
the facts require closer scrutiny. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals focused on concern with the facts of Len-
chyshyn and Pure Fishing in Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Company, Ltd.,74 
71 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
72 Lenchyshyn, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
73 202 F.Supp.2d 905 (N.D.Iowa 2002).
74 260 Mich.App. 144, 677 N.W.2d 874 (Mich.App. 2003).
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when it rejected the Lenchyshyn court’s language, instead stating that “in an 
action brought to enforce a judgment, the trial court must possess jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s property.”75  The Electroli-
nes court may have gone a bit too far in challenging the Lenchyshyn analysis, 
however, when it stated that “the holding of Lenchyshyn is helpful only where a 
party demonstrates that property of the judgment debtor is located within the 
jurisdiction of the court.”76 The facts of Lenschyshyn did not demonstrate the 
existence of such property, but only the allegation of its existence.
A pair of recent cases from Texas rejects the Electrolines limitations on the 
Lenchyshyn analysis, holding that neither personal jurisdiction nor in rem jurisdic-
tion is necessary to support an action for recognition of a foreign judgment. In 
Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd.,77 the Texas Court of Appeal held 
that “the United States Constitution does not require in personam jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor in the state in which a foreign judgment is ﬁ led.”78 
Speciﬁ cally rejecting the analysis in the Electrolines case,79 the Texas court took 
the Lenchyshyn dicta as applicable even when no property of the judgment debtor 
was found within the forum state, concluding that “even if a judgment debtor 
does not currently have property in Texas, a judgment creditor should be allowed 
the opportunity to obtain recognition of his foreign-money judgment and later 
pursue enforcement if or when the judgment debtor appears to be maintaining 
assets in Texas.”80  Beyond ﬁ nding that this result was consistent with the United 
States Constitution, the court found it also to be consistent with the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act as enacted in Texas:
[T]the plain language of the Uniform Act does not require the judgment debtor to 
maintain property in the state in order for that state to recognize a foreign-money 
judgment. [The Act] provides a list of speciﬁ c reasons why the trial court may refuse 
recognition of the foreign-country judgment; however, lack of property in the state is 
not a ground for nonrecognition.81
75 Electrolines, at 260 Mich.App. 163, 677 N.W.2d 885.
76 Id. at 260 Mich.App. 162, 677 N.W.2d 885.
77 260 S.W.3d 476 (Tex.App. 2008).
78 Id. at 480 (determining that the language in Shaffer v. Heitner regarding full faith and 
credit to sister state judgments applies equally to the recognition of foreign judgments).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 481.
81 Id.
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Thus, the court concluded that “a trial court does not have to possess jurisdiction over 
the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s property in order to rule on a motion for 
nonrecognition under the Uniform Act.”82
In 2009, the Haaksman case was followed by the Texas Court of Appeal in 
Beluga Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A.,83 where the court stated:
Under the [Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act’s] express langua-
ge, the trial court “may not, under any circumstances, review the foreign country 
judgment in relation to any matter not speciﬁ ed in Section 36.005.” . . . . Section 
36.005 provides that the trial court may refuse recognition if the foreign country 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in connection 
with the underlying action giving rise to the foreign country judgment for which 
enforcement is sought. The trial court does not entertain claims against the judgment 
debtor in the enforcement proceeding, and does not exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor. Therefore, lack of personal jurisdiction over the judgment 
debtor is not an available basis for resisting the subsequent UFCMJRA proceeding 
in Texas.84
d) Recognition Jurisdiction for Arbitral Awards
Litigation is not the only area in which there is need for the recognition 
and enforcement of dispute settlement decisions. One of the values of the 2005 
Hague Convention is that it goes a good distance in leveling the playing ﬁ eld for 
choice of court and choice of arbitration. The New York Convention has done 
much to make arbitration the preferred choice for dispute settlement in inter-
national contracts.85 It is thus worth looking at how the recognition jurisdiction 
82 Id.
83 294 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.App. 2009).
84 Id. at 305.
85 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The American Inﬂ uence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 71 (2003) (“The singular event of the past ﬁ fty years in interna-
tional commercial arbitration undoubtedly was the signing of the New York Convention 
in 1958.”); Alan Redfern, Having Conﬁ dence in International Arbitration, 57 DISP. RESOL. 
J. 60, 60-61 (2003) (the New York Convention “has been described as the single most 
important pillar on which the ediﬁ ce of international arbitration rests” and “perhaps 
could lay claim to be the most effective instance of international legislation in the entire 
history of commercial law.”).
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issue is dealt with in the arbitration realm, both in order to make a comparison 
to the litigation approach and to consider the approach to implementation of the 
Hague Convention that will provide appropriate parallels to the law applicable 
in the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards.
The recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Frontera Resources 
Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azerbaijan,86 provides useful analysis and 
review of prior cases on the question of recognition jurisdiction for foreign 
arbitral awards. The court held that there must be either personal jurisdiction 
over the award debtor or presence of the award debtor’s assets in the forum 
state in order to conﬁ rm a foreign arbitral award.87
The Frontera Resources court noted that the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits 
had all concluded that either personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction is required 
in a recognition action.88 It then rejected the award creditor’s argument that 
the only limitations on recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
were those found in Article V of the New York Convention, and that U.S. treaty 
obligations thus prevented requiring personal or in rem jurisdiction as a hurdle 
to a recognition action. The court explained its analysis as follows:
The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court’s having jurisdic-
tion over both the subject matter and the parties.” While the requirement of subject 
matter jurisdiction “ functions as a restriction on federal power,” the need for personal 
jurisdiction is fundamental to “the court’s power to exercise control over the parties,” 
“Some basis must be shown, whether arising from the respondent’s residence, his con-
duct, his consent, the location of his property or otherwise, to justify his being subject 
to the court’s power.
Because of the primacy of jurisdiction, “jurisdictional questions ordinarily 
must precede merits determinations in dispositional order.” “[T]he items listed 
in Article V as the exclusive defenses ... pertain to substantive matters rather 
than to procedure.” Article V’s exclusivity limits the ways in which one can 
challenge a request for conﬁ rmation, but it does nothing to alter the funda-
86 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009).
87 Id. at 398.
88 Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 178-79 (3d Cir.2006); Glencore 
Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1120-22 (9th 
Cir.2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory”, 283 
F.3d 208, 212-13 (4th Cir.2002). See also Transatl. Bulk Shipping Ltd. v. Saudi Charter-
ing S.A., 622 F.Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y.1985).
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mental requirement of jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement 
is being sought.89
Frontera Resources and the other Federal Circuit Court decisions resulting 
in similar holdings provide a contrast to the approach taken by the New York 
Appellate Division in Lenchyshyn, particularly as that case has been applied by 
Texas courts in the Haaksman and Beluga Chartering cases dealing with the re-
cognition of foreign judgments. In both of the Texas cases, the court accepted 
the argument that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act 
bases for non-recognition are exclusive and therefore do not allow denial of 
recognition based on lack of jurisdiction over the party or the party’s assets. 
The Texas courts did not address the substance/procedure distinction held to 
be determinative in Frontera Resources.
In noting that other Circuit Courts of Appeal had required either personal 
or quasi in rem jurisdiction,90 the Frontera Resources court implicitly glossed over 
possible differences in those decisions. The Ninth Circuit, in Glencore Grain 
Rotterdam B.V. v. Shiynath Rai Harnarain Co.,91 suggested that recognition juri-
sdiction could exist in the absence of personal jurisdiction, so long as there is 
property of the defendant within the forum state “even if that property has no 
relationship to the underlying controversy between the parties.”92 Even so, the 
court held jurisdiction not to exist because “the best [plaintiff] can say is that 
it believes in good faith that [defendant] has or will have assets located in the 
forum.”93 Thus, while Glencore Grain has been cited as holding that jurisdiction 
may be established when property of the defendant is in the forum state, even 
if there is no relationship between that property and the underlying controversy 
between the parties,94 the facts of the case were deﬁ cient in meeting even this 
test and the court held that no jurisdiction existed.
In Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminim Factory,”95 the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the trial court had determined 
89 Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
90 Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
91 284 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
92 Id. at 1127.
93 Id. at 1128.
94 International Commercial Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Lack of Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens as Defenses to the Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 407, 417 (2004) (“ABCNY Committee Report”).
95 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 822 (2002).
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that “the mere presence of seized property in Maryland provides no basis for 
asserting jurisdiction when there is no relationship between the property and 
the action,”96 and then afﬁ rmed that decision. The opinion, however, discusses 
only personal jurisdiction, and never directly addresses the possibility of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction, leaving it of limited value on the issue.
In sum, the cases on recognition jurisdiction in arbitration have been consi-
stent in holding that either personal jurisdiction or quasi in rem jurisdiction is 
necessary in order to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award under the 
New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act in U.S. courts.97 When 
personal jurisdiction does not exist, the nuances of quasi in rem jurisdiction 
necessary to support a recognition action are not entirely clear. While the lan-
guage of some cases suggests such jurisdiction is possible even when the local 
property is unrelated to the underlying controversy, language in other cases 
suggests that even if local property has been seized by attachment, that will 
not sufﬁ ce. This leads to the question of how the implementation of the Hague 
Convention should deal with such issues.
96 Id. at 211.
97 The overwhelming weight of commentary is consistent with the case law. The draft ALI 
Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration,1 the International Commercial 
Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,2 and the 
leading commentary on international commercial arbitration,3 all ﬁ nd it necessary to 
have either personal jurisdiction over the award debtor or quasi in rem jurisdiction over 
assets of the award debtor for purposes of an action for enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award. For the ALI position, see, ALI, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-19 and Reporters’ Notes (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, March 29, 2010) (stating a requirement of either statutory personal jurisdiction 
and compliance with “general constitutional due-process requirements under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments,” or quasi in rem jurisdiction, but also noting that “a court 
remains free to predicate jurisdiction on consent where the parties entering into an 
agreement selecting that court as a forum for the enforcement of an award,” citing D.J. 
Blair & Co. V. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2006)). For the New York City Bar 
position, see, ABCNY Committee Report, supra note 94. For the principal commentary, 
see, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2399-2400 (2009). Born 
takes the position that “customary jurisdictional limitations on the judicial powers of 
Contracting States” are sufﬁ cient grounds to deny recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award under the New York Convention, but that the application of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens to avoid recognition and enforcement (being, in his analysis, sub-
stantive and not procedural) is not reconcilable with Articles III and V of the New York 
Convention. Id. at 2400 and 2402.
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IV. RECOGNITION JURISDICTION UNDER THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION
a) Threshold Questions Regarding Recognition Jurisdiction
The above analysis suggests a series of questions in addressing the implemen-
tation of the Hague Convention in the United States. Two threshold questions 
deal with whether separate recognition jurisdiction is or should be required 
in order to bring an action for recognition of a foreign judgment under the 
Convention. The ﬁ rst question requires analysis of U.S. law and the second 
requires analysis of the Convention:
1) Can a recognition action under Article 8 of the Hague Convention be brought 
in a U.S. court absent either personal jurisdiction over the defendant or the 
presence in the forum state of property belonging to the defendant?
2) Does the Hague Convention prohibit a requirement that a court in which a 
recognition action is brought under Article 8 have either personal or quasi 
in rem jurisdiction?
It is safe to assume that the answer to each of these questions is “no.” The 
following discussion will address each of these questions.
i) Can a recognition action under Article 8 of the Hague Convention be brought in a 
U.S. court absent either personal jurisdiction over the defendant or the presence in 
the forum state of property belonging to the defendant?
The Second Circuit’s analysis in Frontera Resources necessarily assumes (1) 
that U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence requires either personal or in rem juri-
sdiction for an action to be brought for the conﬁ rmation of an arbitral award, 
and (2) that the New York Convention does not obligate the United States to 
recognize foreign arbitral awards when there is neither personal jurisdiction 
over the award debtor nor assets of the award debtor within the forum state 
at the time the action for recognition is brought. This does not prevent the 
award creditor from (1) collecting on the award when the award debtor has 
assets within the forum state, (2) gaining recognition of an award against an 
award debtor subject to personal jurisdiction in order to be ready to attach 
assets of the award debtor that may come into the forum state in the future, or 
(3) using the award for preclusive effect in defense of claims brought that are 
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inconsistent with the award. It does, however, limit an award creditor in any 
attempt to obtain recognition of the award against an award debtor not subject 
to personal jurisdiction in order to be ready to attach assets of the award debtor 
should they come into the forum state in the future.
Cases dealing with both judgment recognition and the recognition of foreign 
arbitral awards have been generally consistent in requiring that either personal 
jurisdiction or quasi in rem jurisdiction exist before a court may entertain an 
action for recognition. While two Texas cases provide an aberration,98 and the 
language of the Lenchyshyn case from New York suggests the possibility of a 
different result,99 those decisions engage in only limited analysis, not clearly 
addressing the substance/procedure dichotomy and the accompanying Consti-
tutional concerns that have led other courts to a contrary conclusion. Thus, in 
implementing the Hague Convention, it is safe to assume that courts would 
ﬁ nd a Constitutional requirement of personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction to 
apply to recognition actions under Article 8 of the Convention.
ii) Does the Hague Convention prohibit a requirement that a court in which a recognition 
action is brought under Article 8 have either personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction?
The language of Article V of the New York Convention, on which the Frontera 
Resources court based its analysis, provides that “[r]ecognition and enforcement 
of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof” of one of the listed grounds for 
non-recognition.100 This is very similar to the language of Article 8(1) of the 
2005 Hague Convention (“[r]ecognition or enforcement may be refused only on 
the grounds speciﬁ ed in this Convention”).101 The logic of the Frontera Resources 
decision assumes that the exclusivity language of Article V of the New York 
Convention applies only to substantive legal rules regarding recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral award, and not to procedural matters, and that the 
question of jurisdiction for recognition purposes is a procedural matter.
98 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
100 New York Convention, supra note 6, art. V(1).
101 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 8(1).
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These are attractive assumptions for a lawyer trained in the U.S. legal system 
in which the due process clauses of the Constitution pervade just about all as-
pects of the law, and especially judicial jurisdiction. Whether they are equally 
attractive to our treaty partners, most of whom are populated with lawyers 
trained in civil law traditions, is not so clear. In the civil law world in which 
judicial jurisdiction is more likely to be addressed as a matter of whether the 
court is competent to decide a case, and not so much as a question of power over 
the parties,102 it could be easy to read the New York Convention provisions on 
recognition of arbitral awards to require that the courts of a contracting state 
consider themselves competent to recognize foreign arbitral awards.
On a practical level, it can be argued that, unless enforcement is possible, 
there is little beneﬁ t to naked offensive recognition of a foreign judgment. The 
standard situation where recognition without enforcement would be of value is 
when defensive recognition is used to prevent a second action on the same claim 
that is already the subject of the ﬁ rst judgment. The Convention does counte-
nance such recognition without enforcement.103 In such circumstances, however, 
personal jurisdiction in a U.S. court is not likely to raise signiﬁ cant problems. It 
will normally be the defendant asserting recognition for such purposes, and the 
plaintiff will have consented to jurisdiction in bringing the action. If a plaintiff is 
seeking recognition for purposes of preclusive effect in an action not speciﬁ cally 
seeking enforcement, it is logical to assume there will be other claims and other 
bases on which personal jurisdiction over the defendant will exist as well.
The Brussels I Regulation of the European Union provides some insight into 
the civil law approach to the recognition jurisdiction question, but does not 
permit a deﬁ nitive understanding of the intentions of even our European treaty 
partners in regard to these issues for both arbitration and litigation purposes. 
Article 22(5) of the Brussels I Regulation provides for exclusive jurisdiction 
“in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, [in] the courts 
of the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced.”104 
102 See, e.g., UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE 
LAW 718 (7th ed. 2009)
103 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Explanatory Report by 
Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, ¶ 170, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/ex-
pl37e.pdf (“Explanatory Report”).
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 22(5), 
O.J.E.U. L 12/1 (Jan. 16, 2001) (“Brussels I Regulation”).
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Because the Regulation’s jurisdictional rules are not subject to any overlay of due 
process analysis similar to that in the United States, the question of “personal 
jurisdiction” as a U.S. lawyer knows it does not arise. This exclusive jurisdic-
tion provision is focused on enforcement and includes no language regarding 
recognition, and could thus be considered to be the equivalent of a U.S. court 
having jurisdiction to enforce a judgment when assets of the judgment debtor 
are present in the forum state. After all, one cannot obtain enforcement without 
assets, and Article 22(5) applies in the state “in which the judgment has been 
or is to be enforced.”105 Thus, it is difﬁ cult to conclude that a European civil law 
perspective of either of the New York or Hague Conventions necessarily could 
require that the courts of a contracting state assume jurisdiction for purposes of 
recognition when the jurisdictional rules of that state (i.e., its procedural rules) 
would otherwise prohibit it from doing so. At the same time, however, it is dif-
ﬁ cult to assume conclusively that a provision like Article 22(5) of the Brussels 
I Regulation could not be used for recognition purposes, with contemplation 
of prospective enforcement.
While the Hague Convention, like both the New York Convention and the 
two Uniform Recognition Acts, provides an exclusive list of grounds justifying 
non-recognition of a foreign decision, it also recognizes the separation between 
procedural rules and the Convention’s own substantive rules of judgments 
recognition. Article 8(1) of the convention does make clear that “[r]ecognition 
or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds speciﬁ ed in [the] Conven-
tion,”106 but Article 14 provides as well a clear substance/procedure distinction 
like that relied upon in Frontera Resources, stating that:
The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for en-
forcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of the 
requested State unless this Convention provides otherwise. The court addressed 
shall act expeditiously.107
The jurisdictional rules found in Chapter II of the Hague Convention (dea-
ling with enforcement of a choice of a court agreement in the originating court) 
require a chosen court to take jurisdiction and a non-chosen court to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction.108 There are no explicit jurisdictional rules found in 
105 Id. art. 22(5) (emphasis added).
106 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
107 Id. art. 14.
108 Id. arts. 5 & 6. There are limited exceptions in each case to these jurisdictional require-
ments.
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the recognition and enforcement rules contained in Chapter III. Article 8 does 
require that contracting states recognize and enforce qualiﬁ ed judgments under 
the Convention, subject to the exceptions contained in Article 9. In each of 
these articles, however, the title (“Recognition and enforcement” and “Refusal of 
recognition and enforcement”) and the rules are addressed to the combination of 
recognition and enforcement. A U.S. court having neither personal jurisdiction 
over the judgment debtor nor property of the judgment debtor located within 
the forum state will have no ability to engage in enforcement of the judgment. 
Once either type of jurisdiction does exist, then recognition and enforcement 
is both required and possible.
This review of the language of the New York and Hague Conventions provi-
des neither explicit nor implicit indication that the United States has a treaty 
obligation compelling its courts to assume jurisdiction where internal procedural 
rules (the Due Process Clauses as applied to judicial jurisdiction) would prevent 
those courts from doing so. Thus, a requirement in the U.S. implementing le-
gislation that either personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction exist for purposes of 
bringing a recognition action under Article 8 of the Hague Convention is not 
prevented by the Convention.109 The more difﬁ cult question (considered below) 
is whether the United States should conform to other potential Convention 
contracting states and adopt jurisdictional rules that would allow recognition 
actions in the absence of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
b) Secondary Questions Regarding Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
If a requirement is established that either personal jurisdiction or quasi in 
rem jurisdiction is necessary under U.S. law for purposes of bringing a judgment 
recognition action under Article 8 of the Hague Convention, a secondary set 
of questions arises when personal jurisdiction does not exist, and the action is 
brought on the basis of the existence of property of the judgment debtor within 
the forum state. This section addresses these questions.
109 This same conclusion was reached by the International Disputes Committee of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York in regard to arbitration award recognition 
actions under the New York Convention. See ABCNY Report, supra note 94, at 411-16.
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i) Will the mere allegation of the presence of property of the judgment debtor within 
the forum state be enough to support recognition jurisdiction?
A requirement that either personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction exist before 
an action for recognition of a judgment can be brought raises the question of 
just what evidence of quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary when personal ju-
risdiction does not exist. While the language and facts of the Lenchyshyn case 
suggest that the mere allegation that the judgment debtor has assets in the 
forum state is sufﬁ cient to establish jurisdiction for a recognition action,110 the 
jurisprudence of quasi in rem jurisdiction generally requires something more.111 
Thus, a judgment creditor should be entitled to jurisdictional discovery under 
the court’s ordinary rules,112 and such discovery may be necessary in order to 
establish the actual presence of assets within the state sufﬁ cient to provide the 
foundation for quasi in rem jurisdiction.
ii) Will the presence of property of the judgment debtor within the forum state satisfy 
quasi in rem jurisdiction requirements if it has no connection to the underlying claim?
As noted in the discussion above, this question is not clearly answered in 
the existing cases on either judgments or arbitral award recognition.113 The 
International Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York has taken the position that, in regard to the New York Convention, 
the “presence of the debtor’s property within the state, regardless of whether 
it has any connection to the underlying claim, should be sufﬁ cient to establish 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.”114 Here, 
both U.S. jurisprudence on quasi in rem jurisdiction and respect for the pur-
poses of the Hague Convention support that result for the Hague Convention 
as well. In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court stated:
110 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
111 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.8 (4th 
ed. 2005).
112 See the discussion of this issue in regard to arbitration by the International Disputes 
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. ABCNY Report, supra 
note 94, at 410.
113 See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
114 ABCNY Report, supra note 94, at 416.
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The primary rationale for treating the presence of property as a sufﬁ cient basis for 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which the State would not have jurisdiction if 
International Shoe applied is that a wrongdoer “should not be able to avoid payment 
of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he is not 
subject to an in personam suit.” Restatement § 66, Comment a.
This justiﬁ cation, however, does not explain why jurisdiction should be reco-
gnized without regard to whether the property is present in the State because 
of an effort to avoid the owner’s obligations. Nor does it support jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the underlying claim. At most, it suggests that a State in which 
property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of 
proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where 
the litigation can be maintained consistently with International Shoe.115
This is also consistent with the purpose the Hague Convention to increase 
opportunities to recognize and enforce judgments on a global basis.116 Thus, the 
implementing process for the Hague Convention in the United States should 
not require that the judgment debtor’s property in the forum state, upon which 
quasi in rem jurisdiction is founded, have a speciﬁ c connection to the underlying 
claim in the original action in the foreign state.
iii) If recognition jurisdiction is based on the presence of the judgment debtor’s 
property in the forum state, must there be an attachment of that property to 
support quasi in rem jurisdiction?
This question was also considered by the International Disputes Commit-
tee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in its Report on the 
New York Convention. That Committee determined that “due process does 
not require attachment of the debtor’s property for enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award.”117  While that Committee acknowledged that some “state sta-
tutes may require seizure of assets as a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction,”118 
115 433 U.S. at 210 (footnotes and citations omitted).
116 Explanatory Report, supra note 102, at p. 21, ¶ 5 (“The value of a choice of court agree-
ment will be greater if the resulting judgment is recognised and enforced in as many 
other States as possible.”).
117 ABCNY Report, supra note 94, at 418.
118 Id.
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and that “practical considerations may well lead creditors to obtain attachment 
of the assets upon which they base jurisdiction,”119 it concluded that there is 
no Constitutional requirement of attachment prior to conﬁ rming recognition 
jurisdiction.120 The same analysis holds for the establishment of recognition 
jurisdiction in judgments cases.
iv) If recognition jurisdiction is based on the presence of the judgment debtor’s property 
within the forum state, is enforcement of the judgment limited to the value of those 
assets?
This question was answered in the afﬁ rmative by the ABCNY Committee 
both in regard to the recognition of arbitral awards121 and in regard to the 
recognition of foreign judgments.122 The Committee focused its analysis on 
CME Media Enterprises B.V. v. Zelezny,123 an unreported decision of the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In Zelezny, conﬁ rmation 
of a $23.35 million Dutch arbitration award against a Czech defendant was 
sought. The plaintiff conceded that personal jurisdiction did not exist, but 
based its allegation of quasi in rem jurisdiction on the presence in New York 
of the award debtor’s bank account with Citibank. That account had a balance 
of $69.65 when the action was ﬁ led in New York, and had been reduced to 
$0.05 at the time of hearing because of fees assessed by Citibank. The court 
found quasi in rem jurisdiction to exist, and thereby conﬁ rmed the award for 
enforcement, but only to the extent of the $0.05 of defendant’s assets within 
the forum state. Because the court had no personal jurisdiction over the award 
debtor, “any judgment will have no effect beyond the property that forms the 
basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction.”124 Ultimately, the court’s decision was sum-
med up in the following language:
[Q]uasi in rem jurisdiction cannot be based on speculation about the possible existence 
of other property. Because it is the existence of property that provides the basis for 
jurisdiction, and in the absence of minimum contacts, the Court cannot exercise ju-
119 Id. at 419.
120 Id. at 418.
121 Id. at 421.
122 Id. at 426.
123 2001 WL 1035138 (SDNY 2001).
124 Id. at *4.
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risdiction beyond the known assets based on petitioner’s speculation that other assets 
might exist. [The award debtor] is not before the Court; only the limited assets in the 
Account-$0.05-are before the Court. For these reasons, petitioner’s request for discovery 
to locate other assets in this jurisdiction is denied.125
This restriction of recognition of a judgment to the value of the assets which 
form the basis for quasi in rem recognition jurisdiction clearly limits the effect 
of the recognition action itself.
c) A Third Possible Threshold Question: Can recognition jurisdiction 
under the Hague Convention satisfy due process requirements 
absent the presence in the forum state of property belonging to the 
defendant?
At this point, one must ask if all the possible alternatives for analysis have 
been exhausted. The one further analytical option lies with the concept of 
consent as a basis of jurisdiction when no other basis of personal jurisdiction, 
and no quasi in rem jurisdiction, exists. The New York Convention and the 
Hague Convention are both based entirely upon the concept of party consent 
to jurisdiction. But does this concept for jurisdictional purposes extend only 
to the initial action in the chosen forum for resolving a dispute? Does it not 
extend as well to consent to jurisdiction wherever it may be necessary (or at 
least valuable in the eyes of the award or judgment creditor) to seek recognition 
and enforcement of the award?
As noted above, in the vast majority of cases, recognition will not be sought 
in a jurisdiction in which there is neither personal jurisdiction over the judgment 
debtor nor the presence of assets of the judgment debtor against which enfor-
cement may be accomplished. But there may be cases in which the judgment 
creditor ﬁ nds it valuable to obtain recognition of the judgment for purposes of 
possible future enforcement. 
The absence of a due process gloss to jurisdictional analysis in other countries 
that will become parties to the Hague Convention means that such jurisdiction 
normally will be available for purposes of recognition in their courts.126 The 
125 Id. at *5.
126 See, e.g., Brussels Regulation, supra note 18, art 22(5).
 Ronald A. Brand: Recognition Jurisdiction and the Hague Choice of Court Convention208
logic of uniformity argues for applying the rules of the Convention in a similar 
manner in the United States. The existence of the Hague Convention itself 
provides notice that choice of court agreements falling within its scope will be 
honored, and that resulting judgments will be recognized and enforced. Thus, 
consent to a choice of court agreement may easily be seen as consent both to 
dispute resolution in the chosen court and to recognition and enforcement of 
the resulting judgment in any Convention contracting state. 
Consent is always a legitimate basis of jurisdiction, and it clearly satisﬁ es 
due process requirements. Thus, the Convention presents a clear argument for 
implied (if not express) consent to recognition jurisdiction. While implied con-
sent has not been the source of speciﬁ c jurisdictional decisions in recent cases, 
it does have a long history of application in U.S. courts. In 1855, the Supreme 
Court held that a judgment from one U.S. state was required to be recognized 
in other states where jurisdiction was based on the implicit consent to jurisdic-
tion by corporations doing business in the forum state.127 While the language 
of implicit consent has been replaced by a focus on the defendant’s activities in 
and contacts with the forum state, that analytical evolution has not removed 
the legitimacy of consent as a basis of jurisdiction, whether express or implied. 
The Supreme Court has held that a form farm equipment lease containing a 
New York choice of court clause was sufﬁ cient to require Michigan lessees to 
defend against suit in New York,128 and that Washington state consumers of 
cruise ship services “consent” to sue only in Florida even where such consent is 
evidenced only by a small type clause on the back of a cruise ship ticket that 
is received after payment.129 If the parties in those cases can be so bound by 
their consent to jurisdiction, there seems little problem with binding parties 
to a choice of court agreement within the scope of the Hague Convention to 
recognition jurisdiction in a court in the United States for purposes of carrying 
out a foreign judgment from the chosen court.
Such an analysis would be consistent with the Lenchyshyn case in New York, 
and the two Texas decisions that have followed it, and would avoid the need 
127 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 408 (1855) (Ohio statute providing 
for service of process on foreign corporation provided “presumed assent of the corpora-
tion” sufﬁ cient to found jurisdiction over Indiana corporation, making Ohio judgment 
subject to full faith and credit recognition in Indiana).
128 National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
129 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991).
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for any type of quasi in rem jurisdictional analysis. While this approach may 
appear to be inconsistent with the majority of U.S. cases in both the arbitra-
tion and judgments recognition context, U.S. implementing legislation could 
make clear this aspect of the Hague Convention, acknowledging that consent 
to jurisdiction results from a choice of court agreement both for the original 
litigation and for any resulting recognition action. This would provide an 
analysis that would be consistent with both U.S. due process principles and 
the jurisdictional rules found in the legal systems of our treaty partners. If a 
U.S. judgment may be recognized abroad under the Hague Convention even 
in the absence of property in the state of recognition, the result would then 
be a level playing ﬁ eld in which the judgments of our treaty partners would 
be recognized in the United States even in the absence of property in our 
recognizing jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the New York Convention nor the 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements provides an easy answer for U.S. courts to the 
question of recognition jurisdiction when a foreign arbitral award or foreign 
judgment is brought before a U.S. court for recognition and enforcement. The 
majority of cases to date that have addressed the issue of recognition jurisdic-
tion in both contexts hold that an action for recognition requires that the court 
have jurisdiction over either the judgment/award debtor or that assets of that 
debtor be present within the forum state.  On a practical level, this will likely 
create problems only in those cases in which recognition is sought for purpo-
ses of prospective enforcement against a judgment/award debtor who has no 
signiﬁ cant contacts with the forum state and at the time of the action has no 
assets within the forum state on which execution of the judgment/award may 
be obtained. Nonetheless, there exists a strong argument based on the consent 
nature of private party access to the Hague Convention to allow recognition 
jurisdiction even in the absence of property of the judgment debtor in the 
recognizing jurisdiction.
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O SPORAZUMU O IZBORU NADLEÆNOG SUDA
Sud koji primi zahtjev za priznanje i ovrhu strane odluke mora najprije rijeπiti pitanje 
nadleænosti. U veÊini dræava to nije problematiËno, no u Sjedinjenim Dræavama ustavna 
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Newyorπkoj konvenciji ne pruæaju jasno stajaliπte o tome (1) je li potrebna nadleænost ra-
tione personae ili nadleænost quasi in rem putem prisutnosti duænikove imovine i (2) 
ako se oslanja na nadleænost quasi in rem, kakav je navod ili dokaz o prisutnosti imovine 
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